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The Skype is the Limit in Montana: City of Missoula v. Duane Gives
Skype Testimony Almost Free Rein in Courtrooms
Marin Keyes
“The simple truth is that confrontation through a video monitor is not the
same as physical face-to-face confrontation.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, most challenges to the Confrontation Clause have
involved the absence of a witness at trial. With the advent of technology,
however, the challenges have been rapidly evolving.
The
constitutionally provided right of the accused to confront witnesses is
now being analyzed in situations where the witness is physically absent,2
but virtually present in the courtroom through the use of technological
platforms. In the past couple decades, courts across the nation have dealt
with various issues concerning the use of these platforms and the effect
on the Confrontation Clause. The judgments have been diverse, but the
general trend permits witnesses to testify via technological platforms,
albeit usually with certain requirements the witness must meet.3 In 2015,
the Montana Supreme Court followed this trend in City of Missoula v.
Duane when it held the use of Skype, a two-way audio-video electronic
communication program, did not violate the defendant’s right to confront
witnesses.4 This note examines the Court’s divergent view on what is
considered a compelling interest allowing for use of Skype, the lack of
statutory authorization for the Court’s decision, and the unanswered
questions involving courtroom use of Skype.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In early 2013, the city of Missoula charged Michael Arthur
Duane and two others with misdemeanor cruelty to animals after police
officers discovered detestable living conditions in which Duane and the
two other co-owners were keeping their three dogs.5 During the officers’
investigation, they also found the body of a fourth puppy — the death of
which had been the initial reason for the police investigation — in
Duane’s and the co-owners’ motel room.6 The police had Dr. Lindsay

United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24.
See infra Part IV(A).
4
City of Missoula v. Duane, 355 P.3d 729 (Mont. 2015).
5
Id. at 731.
6
Id.
1
2
3
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Sjolin examine the dead puppy, and she assessed the cause of death as
blunt force trauma.7
Though the animal cruelty charges were only brought for the
conditions in which the three living dogs were kept, the prosecution
sought to have Dr. Sjolin testify against the defendants.8 Dr. Sjolin’s
potential testimony, however, became a problem when Dr. Sjolin
relocated to California.9 With Dr. Sjolin’s move and the separation of
the three defendants’ trials, the prosecution faced considerable expense
and difficulty in physically producing Dr. Sjolin for each trial.10
Accordingly, the city prosecutor asked the municipal court to either let
Dr. Sjolin’s supervisor testify in court or to let Dr. Sjolin testify during
the trial through Skype — a live two-way audio/visual communication
system available online.11 Although Duane objected on the basis of his
right to confront the witness against him, the municipal court agreed to
let Dr. Sjolin testify either while physically in court or through Skype.12
Duane’s trial proceeded in August 2013 with Dr. Sjolin
testifying through Skype.13 The jury found Duane guilty of animal
cruelty.14 Duane appealed to the Fourth Judicial District Court and then
to the Montana Supreme Court.15
III. HOLDINGS
On appeal, Duane argued two issues: first, the use of Skype for
Dr. Sjolin’s testimony impinged upon his right to confront witnesses
against him; second, the district court erred in holding an evidentiary
rule, which provided a right to confrontation,16 only applied to civil
cases.17 The opinion quickly dismissed the second issue, agreeing with
Duane that the evidentiary rule applied to both civil and criminal cases,
but finding it to be harmless error.18 The Court devoted much more
attention and space to the first issue calling for the interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause from Article II, section 24 of the Montana
Constitution.
Justice Cotter, writing for the majority, started her analysis by
looking to the groundbreaking criminal case in video testimony —
Maryland v. Craig. In Maryland the U.S. Supreme Court held one-way
Id.
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Mont. R. Evid. 611(e) states: “Except as otherwise provided by constitution, statute, these rules, or
other rules applicable to the courts of this state, at the trial of an action, a witness can be heard only
in the presence and subject to the examination of all the parties to the action, if they choose to attend
and examine.”
17
Duane, 355 P.3d at 731.
18
Id. at 734.
7
8

2015

CITY OF MISSOULA V. DUANE

165

closed circuit television testimony from a child abuse victim did not
violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause because it did not
guarantee “criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face
meeting with witnesses against them at trial.”19 Unlike the U.S.
Constitution, Article II, section 24 of the Montana Constitution explicitly
does guarantee the accused the right “to meet the witnesses against him
face to face.”20 In State v. Stock the Montana Supreme Court recognized
section 24 as a greater protection, but in qualifying the right explained,
“[W]e have never interpreted that greater protection to entitle a criminal
defendant to literal face-to-face confrontation with all witnesses.”21
Additionally, the Court reiterated the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause: “physical presence of the witness, testimony under oath, crossexamination of the witness, and observation of the witness's demeanor by
the trier of fact.”22 Finding testimony via two-way electronic audiovideo communication fit into the limitation on the Confrontation Clause
while meeting all the other elements, the Court in Stock held
constitutional a Montana statute permitting a child abuse victim to testify
in a trial through the use of such technology.23
During his appeal to the district court, Duane argued Bonamarte
v. Bonamarte supported the reversal of his conviction.24 In Bonamarte
the Court held the telephone testimony of a witness to be reversible
error.25 The Court listed various reasons the telephone testimony
violated the Confrontation Clause, with particular emphasis on the
impairment of cross-examination springing from the lack of ability to
observe the witness.26 In Duane’s case the Court reasoned Bonamarte
failed to support the reversal of Duane’s conviction, because it actually
supported the use of two-way electronic audio-video communication
which allows for the observance of the witness.27 Indeed, the Court,
applying Stock’s limitation on the Confrontation Clause, found Dr.
Sjolin’s Skype testimony met all the elements for the Confrontation
Clause. The municipal court trial records showed Dr. Sjolin took the
oath, the defense counsel cross-examined her in real time, and Dr. Sjolin
was able to hear and see people in the court, as well as the court and jury
being able to hear and see her.28

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990).
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24.
21
State v. Stock, 256 P.3d 899, 905 (Mont. 2011) (emphasis in original).
22
Id. at 903 (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 845–46).
23
Stock, 256 P.3d at 905.
24
City of Missoula v. Duane, 355 P.3d 729, 733 (Mont. 2015).
25
Bonamarte v. Bonamarte, 866 P.2d 1132, 1136–37 (Mont. 1994).
26
Id. at 1137.
27
Duane, 355 P.3d at 733.
28
Id.
19
20
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In its conclusion, after repeating the preferred method of
testimony was still the physical presence of the witness in trial, 29 the
Court took the opportunity to announce a distinct exception:
[W]here a moving party makes an adequate showing on the
record that the personal presence of the witness is impossible
or impracticable to secure due to considerations of distance
or expense, a court may permit the testimony of the witness
to be introduced via Skype or a substantially similar live 2–
way video/audio conferencing program that satisfies the
hallmarks of confrontation as herein set forth.30
The hallmarks, gathered from Craig and Stock, are an adversarial
proceeding, a witness under oath present in real time, and direct and
cross-examination with the jury’s ability to hear the testimony and
observe the witness’s demeanor.31
In a short concurrence, Chief Justice McGrath remarked how the
advancement in communication technology has far surpassed what the
Framers of the Montana Constitution could have foreseen.32 McGrath
went on to describe how programs such as Skype offer face-to-face
communication for all users in real time.33 As long as the elements of the
Confrontation Clause were met, McGrath stated face-to-face
communication programs satisfy the face-to-face phrasing in the
Confrontation Clause.34
IV. ANALYSIS
As suggested in the introduction, the Court’s decision to allow
Skype testimony in Duane is not surprising; rather, it is another
demonstration of the modern trend toward an evolving courtroom. With
costs of litigation rising and court dockets reaching saturation, it is no
wonder courts are welcoming the cost- and time-saving methods that
programs such as Skype offer. The use of Skype may come with many
benefits courts are desperately in need of, but Skype comes with dangers
as well. Other courts, in realizing the pitfalls of testimony through
technology, have created obstacles to be overcome before such
technology can be used. Montana has outlined limitations on use as well,
but the limitations have fallen short of those imposed by neighboring
courts. Also, the Montana Supreme Court acted outside the boundaries
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id.
32
Id. (McGrath, C.J., concurring).
33
Id. (McGrath, C.J., concurring).
34
Id. at 735 (McGrath, C.J., concurring).
29
30
31
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set by the Montana legislature when it permitted Skype trial testimony of
adult witnesses. Finally, the Court glossed over the impact the use of
Skype testimony will inevitably have on the judicial system as a whole.
A. Contrary to Other Courts, Montana Holds Cost and Distance as
Compelling Reasons for Permitting Skype Testimony
Of the cases dealing with the intersection between the
Confrontation Clause and testimonial technology, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Maryland v. Craig is the foremost authority. As
discussed above, Craig accepted the practice of using one-way closed
circuit television when a child abuse victim was testifying.35 However,
the Court qualified its decision by declaring the Confrontation Clause
was only satisfied if the physical absence of the witness was necessary to
further an important public policy.36 Most courts have chosen to
implement the public policy test in their own jurisdictions. Courts have
found the test necessary because judges have held electronic
communications programs are inherently different from and less forceful
than physical presence at trial,37 thus the use of such programs deserves
scrutiny.38
In applying Craig’s public policy test, courts have uniformly
held the test satisfied by certain kinds of witnesses deserving heightened
protection, typically afforded through their courtroom absence; these
classes include child abuse victims and those fatally ill or otherwise
infirm. 39 40 The Montana Supreme Court itself applied the public policy
test in Stock, finding the protection of child abuse witnesses from further
trauma was a compelling state interest.41 Another kind of witness, not
quite deserving special protection, but nonetheless furthering public
policy interests is out-of-country witnesses. 42 By allowing such
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990).
Id. at 850.
37
United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The simple truth is that
confrontation through a video monitor is not the same as physical face-to-face confrontation.”).
38
People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (N.Y. 2009) (“Live televised testimony is certainly not
the equivalent of in-person testimony, and the decision to excuse a witness's presence in the
courtroom should be weighed carefully.”).
39
Craig, 497 U.S. at 852–53.
40
Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1101, 1103 (N.Y. 2009) (two-way video testimony permitted where
travel would endanger witness’s health); Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 320 (5th Cir. 2007)
(two-way closed circuit television testimony of terminally ill witness permitted); United States v.
Benson, 79 F. App’x 813, 820–21 (6th Cir. 2003) (video conference testimony of elderly witness too
ill to travel permitted); United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 1999) (two-way closed
circuit television testimony permitted from combined facts of witness’s illness and placement in
Federal Witness Protection Program).
41
State v. Stock, 256 P.3d 899, 905 (Mont. 2011).
42
El-Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, 496 F.3d 658, 668–69 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Internet video
testimony permitted where witness had been denied a visa to the United States); In re Marriage of
Swaka, 319 P.3d 69, 72–73 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (Skype testimony permitted where mother was in
Spain and international travel would substantially burden herself and her children); United States v.
35
36
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witnesses to testify through electronic communications programs, the
courts further the public policy of having necessary and relevant
witnesses at a trial when the witnesses would otherwise be unavailable.43
Despite the traditional use of the public policy test in a past case,
however, in Duane the Montana Supreme Court found cost and distance
to be a compelling factor in allowing Skype testimony.44 In only a
handful of cases have other courts found distance alone to be a
compelling factor, yet those cases dealt with international witnesses
beyond subpoena power,45 an international party who was refused a
United States visa, 46 and an international party who faced considerable
expense in flying to the United States and the added burden of either
bringing her children with her — children who had health issues — or
leaving them behind.47 Opposed to those cases, Duane involved a
witness who relocated to another state.48 Interstate distance has typically
been found to be a factor in cases where the witness was also suffering
from health problems.49 As for the compelling nature of cost, one case
found the estimated cost of $10,000 may be compelling when combined
with other difficulties in obtaining international witnesses.50 Duane did
not include an estimated monetary cost for presenting Dr. Sjolin in the
trials of Duane and the other two co-owners, nor was there a cost for
presenting Dr. Sjolin at Duane’s trial alone.
B. Lack of Statutory Authorization for Skype Testimony
The Court in deciding Duane did not rely on any state statute,
but that is not to say there are no statutes governing the use of two-way
electronic audio-video communication. The Montana Legislature has
seen fit to enact such statutes in three specific areas. First, a statute allow
the use of audio-video communication in mental illness hearings.51 The
statute specifically defines the respondent or patient as present in a
hearing even when using audio-video communication programs, as long
as the program meets certain set out requirements.52 Second, the state
has passed a series of statutes enabling a defendant to not physically
appear in multiple stages of a criminal proceeding including setting bail,
Guild, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3605, *9 (E.D. VA Jan. 17, 2008) (strong case for allowance of video
conference in situation where the witnesses are foreign nationals where physical presence in court
cannot be secured in other ways).
43
Guild, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *9.
44
City of Missoula v. Duane, 355 P.3d 729, 734 (Mont. 2015).
45
Guild, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *9.
46
El-Hadad, 496 F.3d at 668–69.
47
Swaka, 319 P.3d at 72–73.
48
Duane, 355 P.3d at 731.
49
People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1101, 1103 (N.Y. 2009); United States v. Benson, 79 F.
App’x 813, 820–821 (6th Cir. 2003).
50
Guild, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7–8.
51
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53–21–140 (2015).
52
Id.
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initial appearances, guilty pleas and plea agreements, and sentencing.53
Noticeably missing from the list is the ability of a defendant to appear
through two-way electronic audio-video communications during the factfinding trial. Additionally, most of the statutes contain language
detailing the requirements of the two-way electronic audio-video
communications and the necessary agreement of parties to the use of
such technology, with the defendant having the ability to object to it.54
Third, statutes let child abuse witnesses testify via two-way electronic
audio-video communications.55 These statutes codify the requirements to
be met for the use of the such technology, provide for a hearing upon
motion to use such technology, factors to be examined when granting the
motion, and the ability of the court to order the use of such technology. 56
Moreover, the Court upheld the constitutionality of these statutes in
Stock.57
Notwithstanding the abundance of Montana statutes addressing
the use of two-way electronic audio-video communications, the Court
did not see fit to base its Duane decision on the statutes. The Court did
not even attempt to examine the statutes and compare them to the issue
in the case. The Court overlooked a vital part of the interpretation of law
when it failed to assess the legislature’s past action in the realm of twoway electronic audio-video communications. Acting outside established
legislative parameters, the Court in Duane has created a rule with no
statutory backing. Indeed, as argued in People v. Wrotten, it is
reasonable to believe the legislature intentionally excluded the use of
technology in certain circumstances, when the legislature expended
considerable time and effort to draft statutes expressly allowing the use
of such technology in defined circumstances.58 Currently, the next
legislative session will decide whether the Duane rule will be codified,
amended, or rejected.
C. The Unanswered Questions Relating to Skype Testimony
With the Montana Supreme Court approving Skype use for
witness testimony, Skype’s courtroom use will undoubtedly soar.
Lawyers may now be able to afford an expert witness, without
prohibitive travel costs, or regain the ability to present a witness who was
See id. § 46–1–105 (entry of guilty pleas); § 46–7–101 (initial appearance of arrested person); §
46–9–201 (admit to bail); § 46–9–206 (setting bail); § 46–10–202 (presentation of evidence at at
preliminary examination); § 46–12–201(manner of conducting arraignment); § 46–12–211 (plea
agreement procedure); § 46–16–123 (receiving verdict or sentence); § 46–18–102 (rendering
judgment and pronouncing sentence); and § 46–18–115 (sentence hearing).
54
See, e.g., MONT.CODE ANN. § 46–12–201(4).
55
Id. §§ 46–16–226 to 229.
56
Id.
57
State v. Stock, 256 P.3d 899, 906 (Mont. 2011).
58
People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1104 (N.Y. 2009).
53
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previously physically unavailable. Furthermore, an entirely new area of
trial strategy has opened. Litigators will be able to manage the
presentation of cases by selecting certain witnesses to appear through
Skype or not. Most likely litigators will try to produce negative
testimony through Skype, thereby lessening the impact, while having key
emotional witnesses testify in person.
Unfortunately for counsel, however, the procedures regulating
the use of Skype are exceedingly vague. In Duane the Court refrained
from setting concrete guidelines for Skype testimony beyond having the
testimony satisfy the elements of the Confrontation Clause, yet copious
practical considerations remain. Basic questions abound with examples
being the quality of the Skype video, issues with lag and choppy video,
the setting the Skype call may take place in,59 the people allowed to be
present on the witness’s side of the monitor, the concern over off-screen
coaching of witnesses, and many others. Without knowing the
guidelines for using Skype, counsel runs the risk of incorrectly
introducing Skype testimony. The potential pitfalls surrounding Skype
use may lead to an influx in appeals focusing on Skype issues. Another
pitfall of Skype that may result in more appeals is the susceptibility of
Skype to hackers or other interruptions.60
One final concern is the question of preliminary hearings. In
Duane the prosecutor moved for the ability to have a witness testify via
Skype.61 The municipal court granted the motion after a preliminary
hearing in which the defendants were able to voice their objections.62
The statutes allowing child abuse victims to testify through two-way
electronic audio-video communications also require the motion of the
requesting party and a preliminary hearing to be conducted by the
court.63 Missing from the Duane opinion is the insistence on a
preliminary hearing. The Court’s silence on the necessity of preliminary
hearings is a cause for unease in criminal trials. If courts do not have a
preliminary hearing before allowing the use of Skype testimony, then a
defendant loses a forum in which to bring an objection. A criminal
defendant facing the potential loss of liberty through jail time deserves a
chance before trial to object to Skype testimony and argue his or her
reasoning for the objection.
V. CONCLUSION
Dr. Sjolin in Duane was allowed to testify from her own home. Brief of Appellee at 10, City of
Missoula v. Duane, 355 P.3d 729 (Mont. 2015) (No. DA 13-0813).
60
See, e.g., Erin Donaghue, George Zimmerman Trial: Skype Disruption Prompts Confusion During
Witness
Testimony
Wednesday,
CBS
NEWS
(July
10,
2013,
2:38
PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-zimmerman-trial-skype-disruption-prompts-confusionduring-witness-testimony-wednesday/.
61
City of Missoula v. Duane, 355 P.3d 729, 731 (Mont. 2015).
62
Id.
63
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46–16–227 to 229 (2015).
59
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The implementation of Skype testimony in courtrooms will
doubtlessly lead to relief of the overburdened court system. Skype
testimony will lessen the financial drain on parties proceeding with
litigation; it will also save time and increase efficiency by rendering
more witnesses available for trial despite their location, health problems
exacerbated by travel, or fear of testifying against an opposing party in
person. The advantages of Skype, however, should not blind the courts
in respect to its downfalls. To negate the shortcomings of Skype, courts
should work with the legislature to generate strict and clear rules for the
use of Skype testimony. Especially in criminal cases, the defendant
threatened with jail time warrants extra safeguards through the practice
of preliminary hearings. Lest the Confrontation Clause be eroded to a
toothless protection for the accused, the defendant must retain the ability
to argue for his or her right to confront the witness in person.

